Critical Advisory (CVSS v4.0: 9.2 - Critical): On October 20, details of two pre-auth Remote Code Execution (RCE) flaws in the PHP core leaked online ahead of coordinated disclosure. Exploitation allows arbitrary command execution straight from the web server.

• Overview
  • Root Cause
  • Verification & Targets
• Affected PHP Versions
• Threat Landscape & Detection Guidance
  • Behavioral Indicators & Suspicious Child Processes
  • Monitoring Recommendation
• Action Items for Organizations
• Proof of Concept (PoC)
  • Exploit Architecture & Stages
  • Target Requirements
  • Usage & Parameters
  • Profiles & Offsets
• Mitigation & Source Patching
  • 1. Configuration Mitigation (Immediate Stopgap)
  • 2. Automated Quick-Fix Script
  • 3. Source Code Patch (session-upload-progress-counters.patch)
  • 4. Cloudflare WAF Custom Rules
  • 5. FrankenPHP Caddyfile Configuration
  • 6. Lighttpd Configuration
  • 7. Apache Mitigation (ModSecurity & .htaccess)
• Disclaimer

php2shell refers to two critical vulnerabilities (CVE-2026-109618 & CVE-2026-109619) affecting core PHP functionality. The primary demonstrated vector is a heap use-after-free (UAF) in the PHP core session upload progress mechanism leading to arbitrary code execution (zend_call_function / system()).

• Severity: Critical (CVSS v4.0: 9.2)
• Impacted Versions: Reports indicate PHP versions 5, 6, 7, and 8 may be affected. Fixes are primarily expected for currently supported PHP 8 branches, leaving end-of-life (EOL) versions (PHP 5.x, 7.x, 8.0, 8.1) exposed without official vendor patches.
• Industry Tracking: Confirmed by security researchers (watchTowr reproduced CVE-2026-109618; monitoring by Huntress and Florian Roth / process-watcher).

PHP's upload progress handler (php_session_rfc1867_callback in ext/session/session.c) stores two raw zval * bucket pointers (post_bytes_processed and current_file_bytes_processed) directly in live HashTable structures.

During request processing:

1. Trigger: A standard multipart POST request activates progress tracking with default configuration values (session.upload_progress.enabled = 1).
2. Free: A progress update cycle re-reads session data. The function zend_hash_update() destroys the previous data tree using the destructor zval_ptr_dtor, freeing the memory block.
3. Reclaim: The freed bucket memory is reclaimed. The dangling pointer is redirected to crafted zend_fcall_info and zend_internal_function structures.
4. Execution: PHP calls zend_call_function(), resulting in arbitrary system command execution.

• Confirmed on standard php-src builds (including versions 8.4.4 and 8.2.34).
• Uses symbol offsets (--syms) between zval_ptr_dtor and zend_call_function to adapt to distribution-specific binary layouts (e.g., Debian Bookworm, Ubuntu Noble, Ubuntu Jammy).

The following table summarizes the PHP versions affected by CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619, along with their support and patch statuses:

Exploitation of php2shell typically manifests as anomalous child processes spawned directly by PHP worker processes (php-fpm, php-cgi, php-cgi.exe, httpd, apache2).

Monitor and alert on PHP worker processes executing:

• Interactive Shells: /bin/sh, /bin/bash, cmd.exe, powershell.exe
• Script Interpreters: python, perl
• Network / Transfer Utilities: curl, wget, nc, certutil.exe
• Common Reverse Shell Patterns: /dev/tcp/, fsockopen, mkfifo
• Immediate Reconnaissance Commands: whoami, id, uname -a, ipconfig

For Linux-based web environments without an endpoint detection agent, tools like Florian Roth's free process-watcher can be run in observe mode to flag unusual child process spawning in real time.

1. Inventory All PHP Environments:
   • Public-facing web servers running applications like WordPress, Drupal, Joomla, or Magento.
   • Internal appliances, hosting panels (cPanel, Plesk), and bundled standalone binaries (php.exe, php-cgi.exe).
2. Prepare for Patch Windows:
   • Official emergency patches from PHP and downstream Linux distributions are scheduled for release around Wednesday, October 21 at 14:00 UTC (10:00 AM ET).
   • Apply vendor updates immediately once released.
3. Isolate End-of-Life (EOL) Installations:
   • Environments running unsupported versions (PHP 5.x, 7.x, 8.0, 8.1) may not receive official upstream backports.
   • Restrict access via VPN, apply strict WAF rules, or disable public internet exposure.
4. Incident Response & Investigation:
   • If suspicious child processes or unexpected files are detected, isolate the host and preserve web server/PHP logs.
   • Inspect web roots and temporary directories (/tmp, /var/tmp) for dropped webshells or transient execution artifacts.

A fully automated one-click remote exploit targeting CVE-2026-109618 is available in poc_109618.py. The exploit bypasses ASLR remotely using plain HTTP requests to achieve reliable arbitrary command execution.

The attack chain consists of four sequential stages over HTTP:

1. Stage 0 — HTTP Worker Rotation: Aborts the current prefork worker over HTTP to ensure a clean heap state in the newly spawned worker child.
2. Stage 1 — Heap Base Leak: Induces an out-of-memory (OOM) condition via an oversized multipart field (--huge-mb, default 12MB) to trigger uninitialized memory leakage through Set-Cookie: PHPSESSID, extracting the Zend MM 2MB-aligned chunk base.
3. Stage 2 — Libphp Base Leak: Exploits session serialization / HashTable allocation alignment to leak the ZVAL_PTR_DTOR function pointer via Set-Cookie, computing the base address of libphp.so.
4. Stage 3 — Fake Reference & Arbitrary Execution: Forges a fake HashTable structure embedded inside a 167-byte zend_string with pDestructor pointed directly to zif_system in libphp.so. The crafted reference overwrites PS(http_session_vars). When PHP frees the session data, zif_system executes the supplied command.

The default exploit profile targets mod_php under Apache prefork with the following settings:

• display_errors = 1
• memory_limit = 8M (or sufficiently lower than --huge-mb)
• max_input_vars = 1000
• session.use_cookies = 1, session.use_strict_mode = 0
• session.upload_progress.enabled = 1
• Single-worker / prefork process model

# Default command execution against target URL
python3 poc_109618.py -u http://127.0.0.1:8088/index.php

# Execute a custom command (max 14 bytes) and verify via local proof file
python3 poc_109618.py -u http://127.0.0.1:8088/index.php -c 'id>/out/p1' --proof-file out/p1

# Execute command writing to webroot and verify via HTTP GET fetch
python3 poc_109618.py -u http://127.0.0.1:8088/index.php -c 'id>p1.txt' --fetch /p1.txt

The exploit script supports profile-based presets:

• --profile bookworm (Default): Calibrated for the official Docker library image php:8.4.26-apache running on Debian 12 (Bookworm) with Apache 2.4.69.
• --profile lab: Calibrated for custom/minimal Apache 2.4.68 builds.

When targeting local Docker containers (127.0.0.1 / localhost), the script can automatically extract binary symbol offsets directly from the running container using docker/offsets.py and cache them in out/offsets.env. For remote targets where binary layout differs from Debian 12, provide --zif-offset and --dtor-offset manually.

Until official vendor packages are updated in your repositories, you can protect your environments using configuration changes, automated scripts, or by compiling PHP with the included source patch.

The vulnerability relies on PHP's session upload progress mechanism (session.upload_progress.enabled), which is enabled by default. Disabling this directive neutralizes the attack vector while preserving regular file upload functionality:

In your php.ini:

session.upload_progress.enabled = Off

Or for PHP-FPM pool configurations (e.g., /etc/php/*/fpm/pool.d/www.conf):

php_admin_flag[session.upload_progress.enabled] = off

After modifying the configuration, reload/restart your web services (e.g. systemctl reload php-fpm or systemctl reload apache2).

A mitigation helper script is available under the quick-fix/ directory:

• Check Current Status:

  sudo ./quick-fix/run.sh --check

• Apply Mitigation (Dry Run):

  sudo ./quick-fix/run.sh --dry-run

• Apply Mitigation:

  sudo ./quick-fix/run.sh

• Revert Changes:

  sudo ./quick-fix/run.sh --revert

If you build PHP from source or maintain custom distribution packages, a C-level source patch is provided under patch/session-upload-progress-counters.patch.

What the patch fixes: The patch resolves the root cause in ext/session/session.c and ext/session/php_session.h. Instead of maintaining vulnerable, raw zval * bucket pointers (post_bytes_processed and current_file_bytes_processed) into dynamic HashTable structures (which become dangling pointers when the hash table is cleared or re-allocated during upload progress updates), the patch:

• Stores counters as direct zend_long primitives.
• Introduces php_session_rfc1867_sync_counters() to safely resolve and update array entries without dangling references.

How to Apply the Patch:

1. Navigate to the root of your php-src source directory:

   cd /path/to/php-src

2. Test applying the patch (dry-run):

   # Using git (if building from a git clone)
   git apply --check /path/to/patch/session-upload-progress-counters.patch
   
   # OR using GNU patch
   patch -p1 --dry-run < /path/to/patch/session-upload-progress-counters.patch

3. Apply the patch:

   # Using git
   git apply /path/to/patch/session-upload-progress-counters.patch
   
   # OR using GNU patch
   patch -p1 < /path/to/patch/session-upload-progress-counters.patch

4. Recompile and install PHP:

   ./buildconf --force   # if needed
   ./configure <your-options>
   make -j"$(nproc)"
   sudo make install

5. Restart your PHP runtime / web services:

   sudo systemctl restart php-fpm
   # or
   sudo systemctl restart apache2

For legacy systems that cannot immediately upgrade to supported PHP 8.2+ releases (e.g. legacy OpenCart, WordPress, or control panels running on PHP 5.6, 7.4, 8.0, or 8.1), dedicated backports combining the official PHP Group OOM fix with the root-cause counter sync are available:

• 👉 Repository: Anton-Barinov/php2shell-patches
• Includes automated build scripts to compile isolated, side-by-side runtimes into /opt/php-<ver>-patched without overwriting system packages, plus multi-PHP FPM pool hardening tools.

Recommended Cloudflare WAF rule templates to filter malicious traffic are located in the cloudflare-rule-fix/ directory:

• Comprehensive multipart blocking (excluding legitimate upload routes)
• Enterprise plan PHP_SESSION_UPLOAD_PROGRESS request body inspection
• Note: Blocking requests based solely on the PHPSESSID cookie is strongly discouraged as it breaks valid user sessions. Refer to cloudflare-rule-fix/README.md for full rule syntax and details.

To disable the session upload progress mechanism globally in FrankenPHP environments, a Caddyfile snippet is provided.

Add the contents of frankenphp/Caddyfile-snippet to your global Caddyfile block:

{
    frankenphp {
        php_ini session.upload_progress.enabled 0
    }
}

For environments running Lighttpd, you can block multipart requests (POST, PUT, PATCH) on virtual hosts or directories that do not accept file uploads using lighttpd/php2shell.conf:

$HTTP["request-method"] =~ "^(POST|PUT|PATCH)$" {
    $REQUEST_HEADER["Content-Type"] =~ "(?i)^\s*multipart/form-data([;,[:space:]]|$)" {
        url.access-deny = ( "" )
    }
}

Two mitigation options are provided for Apache environments:

• ModSecurity Rule: Block requests containing the PHP_SESSION_UPLOAD_PROGRESS parameter using apache/modsecurity-php2shell.conf:

  SecRequestBodyAccess On
  SecRule ARGS_NAMES "@streq PHP_SESSION_UPLOAD_PROGRESS" \
      "id:1026109618,phase:2,t:none,deny,status:403,log,\
      msg:'php2shell: PHP_SESSION_UPLOAD_PROGRESS field blocked (CVE-2026-109618/109619)'"

• .htaccess / mod_rewrite Rule: For directories that do not require file uploads, block multipart requests before they reach the PHP interpreter using apache/.htaccess:

  RewriteEngine On
  RewriteCond %{REQUEST_METHOD} ^(POST|PUT|PATCH)$ [NC]
  RewriteCond %{HTTP:Content-Type} ^[[:space:]]*multipart/form-data([;,[:space:]]|$) [NC]
  RewriteRule ^ - [F,L]

This project is intended strictly for educational purposes and authorized security research. Use only in environments you own or have explicit permission to test.

• Website: https://enes.dev
• Twitter / X: @enes_dev